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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STREVELL PATERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 1 7598

MICHAEL R. FRANCIS
Defendant and Appellant,

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff-respondent, Strevell Paterson (hereinafter
"plaintiff"), brought suit against defendant-appellant, Michael R.
Francis (hereinafter "defendant"), based on defendant's personal
guaranty of the debts of Mountain Lands Sports, Inc. (hereinafter
"Mountain Lands").
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On December 9, 1980, plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment was heard in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup.

On December

29, 1980, the Court entered an Order granting plaintiff's motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the Order of the District
Court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant's Statement of Facts contains certain inaccurate and irrelevant information, and, therefore, plaintiff
restates the facts as follows:
On January 19, 1977, defendant executed a written

guaranty agreement (hereinafter the "Guaranty") whereby he agreed
to personally guaranty payment of the purchase price of all goods
and merchandise sold to Mountain Lands by plaintiff.

(R. 6).

In

answer to plaintiff's Request for Admissions, defendant admitted
the execution of the Guaranty and the authenticity of the copy
thereof exhibited to the Complaint.

(R. 28).

On April 1, 1978, defendant entered into an agreement

with David J. Toussaint by which defendant purported to sell all
the assets of Mountain Lands to Toussaint.

(R. 36-42).

The

agreement was stated to be effective as of the date of its execution on April 1, 1978.

(R. 36).

On April 5, 1978, defendant, purporting to act in a

representative capacity for Mountain Lands, executed and delivered to plaintiff a promissory note (hereinafter the "Note") in
the principal amount of $14,990.95.

(R. 5).

In answer to

plaintiff's Request for Admissions, defendant admitted the
execution of the Note and the authenticity of the copy thereof
exhibited to the Complaint.

(R. 27-28).

Defendant further ad-

mitted that the Note was given to evidence a debt from Mountain
Lands to plaintiff for past open account purchases of goods and
merchandise.

(R. 28).

On April 14, 1978, defendant, purporting to act in a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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representative capacity for Mountain Lands, entered into a
security agreement (hereinafter the "Security Agre em en t")
granting plaintiff a security interest in all the inventory,
equipment, and other personal property owned by Mountain Lands to
secure the Note of April 5, 1978.

(R. 35).

On June 5, 1979, plaintiff obtained a judgment against

Mountain Lands on the Note in the Third District Court of Salt
Lake County for $16,511.41, with interest thereon at the rate of
12% per annum.

(R. 7-8).

Despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant refused to pay the amount owing from Mountain Lands to plaintiff.
Plaintiff then brought this action seeking to enforce defendant's
compliance with the Guaranty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE ORAL RELEASE AGREEMENT ALLEGED BY
DEFENDANT WOULD BE UNENFORCEABLE AS A
MATTER OF LAW UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Defendant argues that the District Court erred in
granting plaintiff summary judgment based on the Guaranty because the parties allegedly entered into an oral agreement
which released defendant as a guarantor.

The oral release

alleged by defendant would be unenforceable as a matter of
law under the statute of frauds, and, therefore, does not
create a material issue of fact which would preclude summary
judgment in this action.
Section 25-5-4, Utah Code Ann. (2d repl. vol. 1976)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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provides, in relevant part:
In the following cases every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:

* * *
(2) Every promise to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriage of another.

* * *
The Guaranty executed by the defendant was a promise
to answer for the debt of Mountain Lands.

As such, the Guaranty

was within the statute of frauds, and was required to be in writing and subscribed by the defendant.

The requirements of the

statute of frauds were fully satisfied by the written Guaranty,
which bears the defendant's signature.
It is well established under Utah law that any agreement which purports to alter or amend an agreement within the
statute of frauds must also be in writing and subscribed.

In

Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 267 P. 1020, 1035 (Utah 1928),
the Court held:
[T]he original contract to be binding and
enforceable, and to satisfy the statute of
frauds, was required to be, as it was, in
writing and subscribed by the parties
sought to be charged.
To alter or modify
any of its material parts or terms by a
subsequent agreement required one also
to be in writing and so subscribed • • •
This principle was unequivocally reaffirmed in Zions' Propertie~
Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 319, 322 (Utah 1975), in which the Court
said:
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It is elementary that when a contract is
required to be in writing, the same requirement applies with equal force to
any alteration or modification thereof.
The oral release agreement alleged by defendant purports to alter the obligation created by the Guaranty.

Such an

alteration is within the statue of frauds, and is void and unenforceable unless it is in writing and properly subscribed.
Because the alleged oral release agreement does not comply with
the requirements of the statute of frauds, it cannot constitute a
valid defense to plaintiff's suit on the Guaranty.
In his Brief on Appeal, defendant argues that the
alleged oral release agreement is excluded from the statute of
frauds by section 25-5-6(3), Utah Code Ann. (2d repl. vol. 1976).
In so arguing, defendant completely misconstrues the language of
that section.

The portion of the statute relied upon by defen-

dant provides as follows:
A promise to answer for the obligation
of another in any of the following cases is
deemed an original obligation of the promissor
and need not be in writing:

* * *
(3) Where the promise, being for an
antecedent obligation of another, is made
upon the consideration that the party receiving it cancel the antecedent obligation,
accepting the new promise as a substitute
therefore • • • •

* * *
The quoted language deals with a situation in which a
person agrees to assume the debt of another and thereby becomes
soley liable to the obligee of the debt.

Section 25-5-6(3) would
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only be applicable in the instant case if the defendant had
agreed to become solely liable for the existing debt of Mountain
Lands, and, in consideration therefore, plaintiff had cancelled
Mountain Lands' obligation.
this case.

Neither of those things occurred in

Defendant does not claim to have become solely liable

for the obligation, and it has never been suggested by either
party that the alleged release acted to cancel the existing obligation of Mountain Lands.

Consequently, section 25-5-6(3) can-

not be construed to apply to the Guaranty or the alleged release
agreement in this case.
The remainder of defendant's argument at Point II.A.
of his Brief deals with the parole evidence rule.

Discussion of

the parole evidence rule is inapposite as plaintiff did not assert the parole evidence rule as a basis for its Motion for Summary Judgment, and it was not discussed or considered by the
District Court in its ruling.
POINT II
THE ORAL RELEASE AGREEMENT ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT
WOULD BE UNENFORCEABLE FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION.
A.

The Alleged Release Agreement Must Be Supported by Consid-

eration to Be Valid.
A release agreement, like any contract, must be supported by consideration to be valid.

See Holbrook v. Webster'_!,_

Inc., 7 Utah 2d 148, 320 P.2d 661, 663 (1958).

Accordingly, it is

universally recognized that "where there is no consideration
to support the creditor's promise to release the guarantor from
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his contractual liability under the guaranty, the promise is not
binding and is not a defense to an action by the creditor on the
guaranty."

38 Am.Jur.2d Guaranty §80 (1968); 38 C.J.S. Guaranty

§68 (1943); Anno. 126 A.L.R. 1241 (1940).
Contrary to the universal authority, defendant argues
at Point 11.B. of his Brief that no consideration was required
for the alleged release agreement.

In support of this argument,

defendant cites section 70A-3-408, Utah Code Ann. (repl. vol.
1980).

This section falls under the Commercial Paper chapter

of the Utah Uniform Commerical Code.

Specifically, section

70A-3-408 deals with negotiable instruments and obligations.
Obviously, a release agreement cannot be characterized as either
a negotiable instrument or an obligation within the meaning of
the Commercial Paper chapter of U.C.C.

Moreover, it is readily

apparent that plaintiff did not agree to give the alleged release
"in payment of or as security for an antecedent obligation" owed
to the defendant, as section 70A-3-408 contemplates.

Defendant's

reliance upon section 70A-3-408 to support his argument that no
consideration was required for the alleged release agreement is
completely misplaced.
Defendant's reliance on A.M. Castle & Co. v. Bagley,
467 P.2d 408 (Utah 1970) is similarly misplaced.

That case was

decided under section 70A-3-408 and might be cited for the proposition that no consideration was necessary to support the Note
given by Mountain Lands to plaintiff, but it has no applicability
to the issue of

whether consideration was required to support the

alleged release agreement.
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Finally, defendant cites section 70A-2-201 (1),

~

Code Ann. (repl. vol. 1980) to support his argument that no consideration was necessary for the alleged release agreement.

De-

fendant apparently intended to cite section 70A-2-209(1) which
provides:

"An agreement modifying a contract within this chapter

needs no consideration to be binding."

By its own terms, this

section applies only to contracts within the Sales chapter of
the U.C.C.

The Guaranty in the instant case was not a contract

for the sale of goods, and, therefore, section 70A-2-209 would
have no applicability to an agreement purporting to release the
Guaranty.
B.

The Alleged Release Agreement Did Not Constitute an Accord

and Satisfaction and Was Not Supported by Consideration.
Defendant argues at Point II. C. of his Brief that the
alleged release was given in exchange for the Note and Security
Agreement of Mountain Lands and that this arrangement constituted
an accord and satisfaction.

This argument is without merit be-

cause no consideration was given for the alleged accord.
To be valid an accord and satisfaction must be supported by consideration.

As the Court stated in the recent

case of Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372
(Utah 1980):
Accord and satisfaction arrises where
the parties to an agreement resolve that a
given performance by one party thereto,
offered in substitution of the performance
originally agreed upon, will discha:g:
the obligation created under the original
agreement. Essential to its validity
are, (1) a proper subject matter; (2) :ompetent parties; (3) and assent or meeting
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of the minds of the parties; and (4) a
consideration given for the accord. Where
the underlying claim is disputed or uncertain
("unliquidated"), the obligor' s assent
to the definite statement of performance
in the accord amounts to sufficient consideration, as it constitutes a surrender
o~ the right to dispute the initial obligation. Where, however, the underlying claim
is liquidated and certain as to amount,
separate consideration must be found to
support the accord; otherwise the obligor
binds himself to do nothing that he was not
already obligated to do and the obligee's
promise to accept a substitute performance is
unenforceable.
Defendant argues that the Note of Mountain Lands was
given in compromise of the claims of the parties, and, therefore,
constituted sufficient consideration for the accord.
ment has no foundation in the record.

This argu-

Defendant did not submit

to the District Court any affidavit or other sworn statement
avering that plaintiff's claim against Mountain Lands was disputed or unliquidated.

The only evidence before the District

Court indicated that the Note was given to evidence a liquidated
obligation.

In paragraph 6 of his answer to plaintiff's Request

for Admissions, defendant admitted:
Defendant admits that the promissory
note referred to [in] Request for Admission
No. 2 was given to evidence past sales of
goods on open account and other amounts
owed to Strevell Paterson by Mountain
Lands Sports, Inc ••
Defendant's statement that the Note was given to "evidence" an
"open account and other amounts owed" clearly indicates that
plaintiff's claim against Mountain Lands was liquidated in
character.
Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and the burden is upon the defendant to prove its essential
elements.

Defendant failed to file with the District Court any

affidavit or other sworn statement avering that the Note was
given to compromise an unliquidated claim.

Where the only evi-

dence in the record as to the character of the claim for which
the Note was given is defendant's admission that the Note was
given to "evidence" an "open account and other amounts owed,"
the District Court did not err in holding as a matter of law that
the alleged accord was not given in consideration for the cornpromise of an unliquidated claim.
Regardless of whether plaintiff's claim against Mountain Lands was liquidated or unliquidated, defendant's theory of
accord and satisfaction suffers from other fatal defects.

First,

defendant persistently argues that the release agreement allegedly
made by him in his individual capacity was supported by considera·
tion flowing between plaintiff and Mountain Lands.

Defendant has

never claimed that he personally gave any consideration for the
alleged release agreement.

Instead, he claims that the corpora-

tion's act of giving the note and security agreement supplied
consideration for his personal release.

This attempt to merge

his personal identity with that of Mountain Lands is inconsistent
with defendant's position that he is not personally obligated for
the corporation's debts.
An even more fundamental defect exists in defendant's

argument that the act of Mountain Lands in giving the Note and
Security Agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction or was
separate consideration for the alleged release agreement.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This

1

defect appears on the face of the record on appeal to this Court.
Defendant concedes in his Statement of the Facts at pages 2-3 of
his Brief that, "on or about the first day of April, 1978, Defendant MICHAEL R. FRANCIS, sold all interest he owned in the Corporation to DAVID J. TOUSSANT."

The agreement upon which defen-

dant bases his statement that he divested himself of all interest
in the corporation was executed on April 1, 1978 and was stated
to be effective as of the date of its execution.

(R. 36-42).

Significantly, the Note and Security Agreement signed by defendant, purporting to act in a representative capacity for Mountain
Lands, were not executed until April 5, 1978 and April 14, 1978
respectively.

Because defendant admits that he sold all his

interest in Mountain Lands as of April 1, 1978, it must also be
taken as admitted that he was without right, title or authority
to subsequently execute a promissory note on behalf of the corporation or pledge the corporation's property as security for the
Note.

Obviously, the Note and Security Agreement executed by the

defendant after the date on which he admits he sold all his interest in the corporation were of no value whatsoever and could
not constitute valid consideration for the alleged oral release
agreement.
In summary, whether defendant argues that the consideration for the alleged release was the compromise of the claim
underlying the Note or the giving of the Security Agreement, the
result is the same.

Having concedely sold all his interest in

Mountain Lands as of April 1, 1978, defendant could not and did
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not give anything by his subsequent execution of the corporate
Note on April 5, 1978 or the Security Agreement covering corporate inventory on April 14, 1978.
POINT Ill
DEFENDANT'S GUARANTY OF PAYMENT WAS ABSOLUTE,
AND, THEREFORE, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
PURSUE ITS CLAIM AGAINST THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR.
Defendant argues in Point Ill of his Brief that pla~·
tiff's suit on the Guaranty is barred because plaintiff has not
demonstrated what steps have been taken to pursue its claim against
Mountain Lands.

This argument is without merit because defendant's

guarantee was absolute, and, therefore, plaintiff was not required to take any steps to pursue its claim against Mountain
Lands before suing on the Guaranty.

It is universally held, and

has been expressly so stated by this Court, that a guaranty of
"payment," as opposed to a guaranty of "collection," is absolute
in nature.

Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Hydro Swift Corp., 528

P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1974); 38 Am.Jur.2d, Guaranty §110 (1968);
see also, section 70A-3-416, Utah Code Ann. (repl. vol. 1980).
"[Where] the guaranty is absolute, the creditor need not pursue
any claim which he might have against the debtor's property before
proceeding against the guarantor."

38 Am.Jur.2d, Guaranty §110

(1958).
As the Court observed in Westinghouse, supra:
Whether a creditor • • • has a duty to pursue
the debtor • • • as a predicate to action
against a guarantor • • • depends on the
nature of the guarantor's promise.
The Guaranty executed by the defendant provides:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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[W]e hereby guarantee and hold ourselves personally
responsible for the payment at maturity of
the purchase.price of all such goods, wares,
and merchandise so sold and delivered whether
evidenced by open account or note. (Emphasis
added). (R. 6).
By guarantying "payment" of the indebtedness of Mountain Lands rather than the collection thereof, defendant became
obligated to honor the Guaranty without regard to any action
taken by the plaintiff in pursuit of its claim against the principal debtor.

Having given his absolute guaranty, defendant may

not now argue that plaintiff has not properly pursued collection
efforts against Mountain Lands.
CONCLUSION
The District Court correctly held that no valid release
agreement existed between the parties, and that defendant was
liable to plaintiff on his personal guaranty.

The oral release

agreement alleged by defendant would be invalid and unenforceable
as a matter of law either because it did not comply with the requirements of the statute of frauds or because it was not supported
by valid consideration.

Defendant's guaranty of payment was

absolute in nature, and, therefore, plaintiff was not required to
pursue collection efforts against the principal debtor before
instituting suit on the Guaranty.
The Order of the District Court should be affirmed.
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